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For  one  thing,  such  agreements  can  en-
courage risky investments in innovative prod-
ucts  and  services.  For  another,  when  domi-
nance does occur in a market subject to rapid 
technological change, it is typically fleeting: 
There  is  now  a  long  history  of “dominant” 
digital technologies – everything from Micro-
soft’s Internet Explorer Web browser to the 
MySpace social networking Web site – that 
failed to check emerging competitors.
the market for handsets  
and the next big thing 
The first handset for cellular technology net-
works was introduced by Motorola in 1973. 
The handset, called the DynaTAC, offered 35 
minutes of talk time and weighed 2.2 pounds. 
In 1983, Motorola brought out a lighter ver-
sion, with a list price of $4,000. Six years later, 
Motorola unveiled the MicroTAC flip phone, 
weighing  12  ounces  and  initially  priced  at 
$2,995.  Fortune  magazine  predicted  that 
“Portable phones won’t get a lot smaller than 
this one. After all, they have to reach from 
your ear to your mouth.”
Needless  to  say,  Fortune  was  wrong.  In 
1996,  Motorola  introduced  the  3.1  ounce 
StarTAC. And while the StarTAC led to simi-
lar end-of-innovation auguries, it proved no 
more memorable than a host of handsets that 
were  thinner  or  more  flexible  or  offered 
breakthrough features ranging from Web ac-
cess  to  text  messaging  to  cameras  to  MP3 
players. 
With major innovations in handsets com-
ing from a number of firms, including Nokia, 
Palm,  Research  in  Motion  (RIM)  and,  of 
course, Apple, we would expect to see changes 
in market share over time and the absence of 
a clearly dominant firm. That tracks what has 
actually happened in recent years. 
Consider first the market niche for “smart-
phones,” the high-end phones that offer mul-
tiple advanced features. While the iPhone got 
more press, RIM’s BlackBerry Curve moved 
past Apple’s iPhone to become the best-selling 
smartphone  for  non-business  users  in  the 
United States in the first quarter of 2009. In-
deed, Verizon’s introduction of new models 
and  its  aggressive  marketing  pushed  RIM’s 
share  of  smartphone  sales  in  the  United 
States  to  nearly  50  percent  in  2009,  while 
Apple’s and Palm’s shares declined 10 percent 
each.
The lack of a manufacturer or model with 
staying power that could rightly be labeled 
“dominant” is even more stark when one con-
siders global smartphone sales. Nokia, the in-
dustry leader, sold almost four times as many 
smartphones as Apple did in the first quarter 
of 2009, but hardly dominates: RIM’s share of 
the market has grown from 8 percent to 20 
percent since 2007, while Nokia’s share has 
slipped from 47 percent to 41 percent. 
Indeed,  the  only  straightforward  conclu-
sion  one  can  make  about  the  smartphone 
segment  is  that  it  is  unstable.  Apple  only 
emerges  on  the  list  of  leading  suppliers  in 
2008,  while  Motorola  and  Palm  go  from 
major  vendors  to  distant  also-rans.  Share 
shifts have largely been driven by the intro-
duction of models that captured consumers’ 
imagination – albeit briefly. The big hits: the 
Blackberry Pearl and Curve, and, of course, 
the iPhone. Only Nokia seems to have a mar-
keting  strategy  that  yields  relatively  stable 
sales;  the  company  offers  numerous  smart-
phone models at widely varying prices. 
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The picture in the rest of the mobile phone 
market (which still accounts for over 85 per-
cent of total sales) is quite similar. Nokia is 
the market leader, yet its share of the market 
was  below  40  percent  through  the  entire 
2005-09 period. The fortunes of other makers 
ebbed  and  flowed,  with  Samsung  and  LG 
posting big net gains over the period at the 
expense  of  Motorola,  Sony  Ericsson  and 
BenQ Mobile. And there is every indication 
that  other  makers  are  waiting  to  pounce 
when the leaders stumble: one handset in four 
is made by companies with very modest mar-
ket shares today.
is the iphone a must-have?
Economists  are  concerned  about  exclusive 
contracts  between  an  upstream  input  pro-
vider (in this case, a handset maker) and a 
downstream distributor (a wireless carrier) if 
the excluded input is needed by the distribu-
tor’s rivals to compete effectively. Inputs that 
are deemed essential to preserve downstream 
competition are called “must-have” ones. Al-
though there are a few prominent examples – 
the rights to broadcast the games of a popular 
sports team – it is hard to conceive of must-
have  inputs  in  telecommunications,  where 
breakneck innovation causes arguably domi-
nant inputs to lose their special appeal very 
rapidly. 
Is the iPhone that special case of a must-
have  input?  Apple’s  entry  into  the  smart-
phone market attracted a fanatical following 
after its debut in the summer of 2007. But 
none of its features fit the definition of must-
have. We identified seven features as the cur-
rent iPhone’s biggest selling points. 
• It syncs easily with Apple’s popular iTunes 
software. 
• It supports thousands of applications dis-
tributed by Apple’s App Store.
• Its touch-screen interface features “multi-
touch” capabilities.
• It supports video streaming of media files. 
• It runs over a fast 3G data network.
• Its built-in camera allows users to upload 
images  to  social  networking  sites  like  Face-
book.
• It includes a GPS chipset that allows users 
to pinpoint their locations.
None of these features are exclusive to the 
iPhone.  Four  other  recently 
introduced  smartphones  – 
the  Palm  Pre,  Blackberry 
Storm2,  Nokia  N97  and 
HTC G1 – all have GPS chips, digital cameras 
and touch screens; all sync with iTunes soft-
ware  in  one  way  or  another,  and  all  offer 
video streaming on 3G networks. 
The phones are not, of course, identical. 
The iPhone’s touch screen is more sophisti-
cated in function and far more applications 
are available for the iPhone than for any of its 
rivals. Indeed, this latter advantage is often 
compared with the Windows-based PC’s ad-
vantage  over  Mac  OS  X  and  Linux-based 
computers.
Windows-based computers retain a com-
manding share of the business market at least 
in  part  because  so  many  applications  have 
been written for the Microsoft operating sys-
tems. There are good reasons to believe, how-
ever,  that  the  iPhone’s  lead  in  applications 
will narrow fairly quickly. Google’s Android 
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platform, which is used in the HTC G1, al-
ready  has  thousands  of  third-party  applica-
tions,  and  tens  of  thousands  of  developers 
have downloaded the software-development 
kit for the Palm Pre. 
Competition, by the way, is not only lead-
ing  to  innovative  designs  comparable  to   
the  iPhone,  but  has  also  ensured  that  the 
prices for smartphones have declined to lev-
els  that  many  more  Americans  can  afford. 
Apple dropped the sticker price on its earlier- 
generation iPhone to $99 in 2009 (upon the 
introduction of the iPhone 3GS), and Palm 
reduced the price of its Pre shortly after its   
introduction.
If competition is alive and well in smart-
phones, why was Apple able to maintain its 
lead  in  the  United  States  for  several  years? 
The most plausible explanation is that RIM – 
the company that makes Blackberrys – stum-
bled in one round of innovation (and mar-
keting)  with  the  original  Blackberry  Storm. 
The  applications  gap,  combined  with  the 
manual syncing required to load applications 
on the Storm, hardly helped. But there were 
other  problems,  too:  the  screen-based  key-
board on the Storm didn’t please Blackberry 
users accustomed to a better QWERTY key-
board.  Moreover,  the  handset’s  many  func-
tions  were  less  intuitive  to  use  than  the 
iPhone’s. And, of course, the iPhone was sup-
ported by Apple-quality advertising and glitzy 
Apple stores. 
But the fact that the Storm was a disap-
pointment does not mean that the iPhone’s 
market position is permanent. RIM will likely 
learn from its failures. Indeed, RIM and Veri-
zon  introduced  the  Storm2  in  late  2009, 
which offers better touch-screen input as well 
as a Wi-Fi alternative to Verizon network ac-
cess. Meanwhile the new Blackberry Tour, a 
smartphone  that  relies  on  the  signature 
Blackberry  trackball  and  keyboard,  has  re-
ceived glowing reviews. 
It’s  worth  noting,  moreover,  that  Apple  
occasionally  stumbles,  too.  In  2005,  Apple 
joined  with  Motorola  and  Cingular  (now 
AT&T) to produce the ROKR, a cell phone 
that synchronized with iTunes and could play 
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music like an iPod. But the ROKR didn’t at-
tract customers. No surprise there: it lacked 
intuitive controls, carried only a few hours of 
music, and took roughly an hour to transfer a 
complete set of songs to the device. Just two 
years, later, though, Apple was back with the 
iPhone. 
the logic of exclusive agreements 
If the iPhone isn’t a must-have input – or if 
its must-have status is fleeting – the exclusive 
agreement between Apple and AT&T doesn’t 
give the latter the sort of market power that 
worries trustbusters. Nonetheless, it’s worth 
examining the role for exclusive agreements 
in the telecommunications industry both be-
cause they are common and because there’s 
reason to believe that, contrary to intuition, 
they serve the interests of consumers.
T-Mobile was the exclusive distributor of 
Danger’s  Sidekick  (2002),  while  Motorola’s 
iconic  Razr  V3  was  offered  exclusively  by 
AT&T (2004). The Blackberry Pearl was in-
troduced  exclusively  by  T-Mobile  (2006), 
while  only  AT&T  offered  the  Blackberry 
Curve  (2007).  Indeed,  with  very  few  excep-
tions, most successful handsets in this decade 
have initially been marketed by a single wire-
less carrier in the United States. 
The  reason  manufacturers  and  carriers 
enter into exclusive contracts is not, on its 
face, obvious. After all, such agreements im-
pose costs as well as benefits on both parties. 
Take the iPhone deal. At the time the contract 
was signed, AT&T had a 30 percent share of 
the  U.S.  wireless  market.  So  the  agreement 
meant that 70 percent of wireless customers 
would  have  to  switch  carriers  to  use  the 
iPhone. And it’s tough to get customers to 
switch.  From  this  perspective,  Palm’s  exclu-
sive deal with Sprint for distribution of the 
Pre is even more curious, since Sprint con-
trols just 11 percent of the market. 
Still,  most  handsets  are,  at  least  initially, 
sold exclusively by a single wireless carrier. So 
handset makers must think the benefits of ex-
clusive  deals  outweigh  the  costs.  And  it  is 
plain  that  the  primary  benefit  for  them  is 
risk-sharing. From the perspective of Apple, 
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not bear the whole burden in the event the 
iPhone flopped. 
The agreement also served Apple by ensur-
ing  that  AT&T  would  make  substantial 
iPhone-specific investments to back the com-
mitment.  Handset  manufacturers  typically 
require  operators,  as  part  of  an  exclusive 
agreement, to commit to investing in techni-
cal support for new handsets – no small thing 
for an awesomely complex piece of electron-
ics  like  a  smartphone.  But  the  largest  com-
mitment  that  carriers  typically  make  is  to 
subsidize  the  cost  of  purchase  in  hope  of 
earning back the money by selling services. 
The iPhone debuted unsubsidized, at a price 
of $499 ($599 with more memory). However, 
to  reach  beyond  the  “early  adopters”  who 
lined up for hours to be among the first to 
own  Apple’s  coolest-ever  gadget,  AT&T 
agreed  to  pay  Apple  $300  for  each  early 
model, leaving AT&T’s customers to pay $199 
(and, of course, to sign a multiyear contract 
for  network  services).  For  its  part, Verizon 
paid RIM roughly $200 toward the $399 price 
of the original Blackberry Storm, while Sprint 
pays Palm at least $340 for each Pre. And even 
lower-end phones backed by exclusive distri-
bution  contracts  can  draw  $100  subsidies 
from carriers.
The iPhone is surely a money-maker for 
Apple.  But  the  shortcomings  of  the  once- 
eagerly  anticipated  Motorola  ROKR,  RIM 
Blackberry Storm, and Nokia N97 highlight 
the uncertainty faced by hand-
set  makers  introducing  new 
models. Apple reportedly spent 
$150  million  developing  the 
iPhone, while most of Palm’s $400 
million R&D budget in fiscal years 
2008 and 2009 presumably went into 
the Pre.
Exclusive contracts also facilitate 
the  coordination  of  marketing  ef-
forts between downstream distrib-
utors and upstream manufacturers. 
In the absence of an exclusive agree-
ment, distributors will be hesitant to 
invest in marketing that will also ben-
efit rival distributors. If, for example, the 
Blackberry Storm had been available to all 
carriers, Verizon would likely have spent less 
to promote it – or simply refused to distrib-
ute it. 
Note, moreover, that, in this case, what’s 
good for handset makers and wireless carriers 
is also good for consumers. By allowing opti-
mal risk-sharing and marketing outlays, ex-
clusivity  increases  the  expected  return  and 
thus the pace of innovation. 
Exclusive marketing may also allow manu-
facturers to closely monitor distribution so 
that the product does not become associated 
with sellers who might harm the brand. This 
point  is  particularly  applicable  to  wireless 
handsets because the final product is neces-
sarily tied to the network on which it is used. 
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Thus, through an exclusive contract, a manu-
facturer like Apple can ensure that its handset 
is only used on a wireless network that can 
meet its standards. AT&T, it’s worth noting, 
invested  an  additional  $2.5  billion  in  spec-
trum to accommodate the release of the data-
hungry iPhone 3GS. 
why the critics are wrong
Critics  of  exclusive  contracts  for  handsets 
begin their analysis with a faulty premise – 
namely  that  carriers  impose  the  exclusion 
provisions  on  the  handset  manufacturers. 
Under  the  traditional  paradigm  of  monop-
oly-leveraging, a carrier with excessive down-
stream market power demands exclusivity as 
a condition of granting access to the carriers’ 
customers.  Having  secured  exclusivity,  the 
carrier then denies the must-have input to its 
rivals. 
But it is often the handset manufacturers 
that  press  for  exclusive  agreements.  For  ex-
ample, Apple used the exclusive contract with 
AT&T  as  a  means  to  secure  control  of  the 
iPhone brand. As part of the deal, Apple de-
manded that AT&T not place AT&T’s name 
on  the  phone,  that  AT&T  share  subscriber 
revenues, that the iPhone not be made avail-
able outside Apple or AT&T stores, and that 
Apple maintain sole discretion as to whether 
to repair or replace defective handsets. Apple 
also insisted that the iPhone’s development 
be secret. (Only three AT&T executives were 
permitted to see it prior to its release.)
Since AT&T voluntarily signed the agree-
ment, it plainly expected to benefit in spite of 
Apple’s  unprecedented  inroads  into  the 
downstream end of the wireless business. But 
the agreement was certainly not a unilateral 
exercise of market power on the part of AT&T. 
Verizon, the carrier with the largest market 
share, rejected a similar offer from Apple. 
While the story of Palm’s deal with Sprint 
doesn’t show which party was more eager to 
make it exclusive, there is no evidence that 
Sprint sought to use the contract as a means 
of  exercising  market  power.  Dan  Hesse, 
Sprint’s CEO, said the acquisition of the Pre 
marked Sprint’s “coming-out party”: the elite 
handset would highlight the value of Sprint’s 
reorganized customer service and improved 
network. Palm, for its part, had been suffering 
a long drought in sales and, one may presume, 
was reluctant to bet the farm on its iPhone-
fighter. 
the bigger picture
We’ve  focused  on  competition  in  handsets. 
But, with rare exceptions, cell phone consum-
ers buy the whole package – handset, operat-
ing system and network services. And while 
marketing leads the media to focus on the 
handset portion of the business, much of the 
innovation that threatens to change the peck-
ing order in wireless communications is com-
ing from other quarters.
As of mid-2009, the wireless carriers were 
battling to be the first to implement a 4G – 
fourth generation – wireless network. There 
are  two  major  4G  technologies  in  develop-
ment:  LTE  (Long  Term  Evolution)  and 
WiMax. Both promise more speed and versa-
tility, and either could have a momentous im-
pact on the wireless industry. Verizon, AT&T, 
T-Mobile  and  MetroPCS  are  all  developing 
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LTE networks. Verizon has announced that it 
will deploy LTE in 2010, while AT&T has in-
dicated that that it will unveil LTE in 2011. 
Sprint  has  a  joint  venture  with  Intel  and 
Clearwire (a major provider of high speed In-
ternet access) to deploy a 4G WiMax network. 
The relative success of the rival wireless carri-
ers (along with their handset partners) may 
well turn on the impact of their versions of 
4G on the consumer experience. 
Meanwhile, innovation in the least visible 
part of the wireless market, handset operat-
ing system software, also has the potential to 
reorder the wireless landscape. While the full 
impact of 4G networks won’t be felt for years, 
the next generation of mobile operating sys-
tems  that  will  displace  Nokia’s  Symbian, 
RIM’s Blackberry and Microsoft’s Windows 
Mobile OS is just around the corner. 
Some of the newest smartphones are based 
on the open-source Linux OS, which runs ev-
erything from servers to cell phones. Open 
sourcing offers a low-cost alternative to pro-
prietary software and makes it easier for third 
parties to develop applications for a platform 
that runs on many different devices. World-
wide  sales  of  Linux-based  phones  in  2008 
were up 19 percent from the previous year, 
while the share of the once-popular Symbian 
operating systems slid significantly. All told, 
nearly 9 percent of smartphones sold in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 were Linux-based, up 
19 percent from 2007.
In the summer of 2008, Google launched 
its Linux-based open-source Android operat-
ing system with the Open Handset Alliance of 
47 telecommunications and technology com-
panies. T-Mobile was the first to offer an An-
droid phone, the G1 from HTC. And a year 
later, T-Mobile released its second-generation 
Android phone (called myTouch 3G) in Eu-
rope and Asia. MyTouch is a version of HTC’s 
well-received Hero handset, which gives users 
access to the significant and growing library 
of  apps  developed  for  Android.  Google  ex-
pected that some 18 different Android phones 
would be available by the end of 2009. 
Finally,  Linux  Mobile  (“LiMo”)  is  being 
developed by an association of 50 technology 
and telecommunications companies, includ-
ing  Samsung  and  Vodafone.  LiMo  differs 
from Android and WebOS (which runs the 
Pre); the consortium is focusing on building 
a flexible platform rather than a user inter-
face. The goal is to cut handset-development 
costs while leaving phone makers free to cre-
ate  unique  user  interfaces.  Currently,  LiMo 
has over 30 handsets, including several mod-
els by Motorola, NEC and Panasonic.
learning from past mistakes
The lesson from wireless handsets (and a half-
dozen other telecommunications and IT mar-
kets)  is  pretty  clear:  in  dynamic  industries, 
regulators need to be more tolerant of new 
technologies that appear to be dominant, or 
risk slowing innovation. But this has proved 
an elusive lesson for the FCC. 
The agency has at times prematurely de-
clared technologies to be dominant and im-
posed harmful regulation. In the late 1970s,   
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it required that wireline (jargon for old-fash-
ioned  land-line)  telephone  companies  “un-
bundle”  equipment  from  services.  And  in 
1981, it extended this requirement to the tele-
phone companies’ cellular operations. Cellu-
lar  providers  affiliated  with  wireline  tele-
phone  companies  could  not  sell  mobile 
handsets; nor could they offer certain addi-
tional services like voicemail. 
In 1992, the FCC acknowledged that com-
petition  rendered  such  regulation  unneces-
sary and allowed the bundling of cellular ser-
vice and handsets. But for the intervening 11 
years, all the potential economies associated 
with selling handsets and wireless services as 
a package were lost. 
We lack data for U.S. handset sales prior to 
1990. But we do know that most of the hand-
sets sold here used the CDMA digital stan-
dard,  while  most  of  the  phones  sold  else-
where  did  not.  We  also  know  that  CDMA 
sales were nonexistent in the 1980s, sputtered 
in the early and mid-1990s, and did not reach 
10 million units until 1998. In contrast, the 
sales of non-CDMA phones reached 10 mil-
lion units by 1993.
What accounts for this five-year lag behind 
Europe and Asia? The most plausible expla-
nation is Federal Communications Commis-
sion  interference,  which  took  the  form  of 
banning  the  joint  sale  of  handsets  and  ser-
vices, and holding up incumbent landline op-
erators  (who  were  poised  to  offer  wireless) 
until another entrant established a foothold.
We are not the first to link the FCC’s regu-
latory  intervention  in  the  mobile  handset 
market  to  reductions  in  consumer  welfare. 
Back  in  1997,  Professor  Jerry  Hausman  of 
MIT  concluded  that “regulatory  indecision 
made a new good, cellular telephone unavail-
able in the United States when it was being 
offered in Scandinavia and Japan using equip-
ment invented by AT&T Bell Labs.” Hausman 
estimated  that  the  delay  in  making  cellular 
service  widely  available  cost  Americans 
roughly $25 billion a year. 
the benefits of forbearance 
Regulators  may  find  it  hard  to  ignore  the 
whiffs of market power given off by muscular 
players in markets that are routinely shocked 
by innovation because it is hard to know what 
good  things  might  have  happened  if  they 
hadn’t intervened. In contrast, the benefits of 
intervention are easier to assess, and there is 
often a constituency that stands to reap those 
benefits. For example, some small rural carri-
ers argue that terminating the iPhone-AT&T 
exclusive contract would enable them to offer 
the  iPhone  and  more  aggressively  compete 
with AT&T for customers. 
But  do  small  carriers  (or  AT&T’s  giant 
competitors)  need  access  to  the  iPhone  to 
compete effectively with AT&T? The question 
should not be whether a company like Cellu-
lar South would benefit from access to the 
iPhone (it likely would), but rather whether 
Cellular South needs the iPhone to constrain 
the price of AT&T’s wireless offerings or to in-
duce rival handset makers to accelerate deliv-
ery of competing smartphones. And though 
the iPhone represented a marketing triumph 
for Apple and AT&T, there is nothing about it 
that constitutes a must-have input.
More  generally,  while  regulators  look 
askance at virtually any vertical restraint that 
leaves rivals out in the cold, the burden of 
proof should rest with those who claim that 
consumers (as well as rivals) will be harmed. 
It is very hard to predict the impact of chang-
ing technology or consumer taste, especially 
in markets in which innovation has a way of 
redefining  the  product.  And  in  a  world  in 
which economic growth so depends on inno-
vation, the stakes are just too high for regula-
tors to guess. m